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Phrónêsis, Aristotle, and Action Research 
Olav Eikeland 
This article presents an interpretation of Aristotelian phrónêsis and its 
relevance for action research. After pointing out some insufficiencies in 
how phrónêsis is applied by other interpreters with relevance for action 
research, I present my own interpretation of Aristotle’s concept in the 
wider context of his thinking on intellectual and ethical virtues. The  
article’s conclusion is that phrónêsis is very important for both action  
researchers and others. But at the same time, phrónêsis is not a concept 
that can be adopted by itself, alone, and in isolation from other intellectual 
and ethical virtues or ways of knowing. Phrónêsis is necessary, but at the 
same time insufficient. Phrónêsis is not a concept primarily concerned 
with learning, inquiry, and research. Its primary focus is “application”, 
performance, or enactment. Action research has a lot to learn from  
Aristotle, and phrónêsis is definitely among the things to be learned.  
Aristotle’s praxis-orientation sticks even deeper, however. This more  
profound praxis-orientation becomes quite invisible by operating with 
simplified and mutually exclusive divisions between phrónêsis, tékhnê,
and epistêmê, and by conflating other distinctions that were important to 
maintain for Aristotle. Aristotle’s profound praxis-orientation is even 
more central to action research. It has to do with dialogue or dialectics 
whose tasks really are fundamentally concerned with learning, inquiry, 
and research. 
Key words: Action research, Aristotle, Dialogical research, Judgement, 
Phrónêsis, Prudence, Rhetoric, Virtues, ethical and intellectual 
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Introduction
The purpose of this article is to discuss the relevance of the Aristotelian con-
cept of phrónêsis for action research. Phrónêsis usually translates as “pru-
dence”, “practical wisdom” or “judgement” in English. The concept is cur-
rently receiving increased interest among a broad range of professionals and 
social scientists, including action researchers. Paul Ricoeur (1997: 21) speaks 
of a “retour a Aristote”. This process of rediscovery no doubt springs from a 
deeply felt desire for finding concepts to grasp kinds of knowledge and skills 
that are directed towards understanding and acting in accordance with re-
quirements of the concrete situations we find ourselves in. The search is for 
non-technical, non-mechanical ways of recognising the sovereignty and inde-
pendence of our everyday cognitions and judgements, without constantly be-
ing referred and subordinated to “science”. Phrónêsis appears to be a concept 
with a great potential for this. The primary source for all attempts at redis-
covering and revitalising the concept of phrónêsis is, as a matter of historical 
fact, Aristotle (384-322 BC). In this article, then, I will discuss a) the Aristo-
telian meaning of phrónêsis based on my continuous preoccupation with the 
texts of Aristotle for more than 20 years (cf. Eikeland 1997, 1998, 2001, 
2007), and b) in what ways phrónêsis might be relevant for action research, 
based on my action research work over an equal amount of years (cf. e.g. 
Eikeland 1987, 1995, 2006a, Eikeland/Berg 1997). This article summarises 
some of the conclusions from Eikeland (2007). There are always controver-
sies regarding the interpretation of old texts. Such controversies are dealt 
with in more detail in Eikeland (1997 and 2007), which also brings in many 
concepts, aspects, and arguments, and contains detailed references to the 
works of Aristotle not possible to reproduce here.1
I will not spend much time here explaining systematically what I think ac-
tion research is or should be, even though there are many variants working in 
1  I would like to thank Werner Fricke for taking the initiative that has produced both 
Eikeland (2007) and the present article. I am also grateful for his great but strained pa-
tience in waiting for things to get finished. 
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very different ways.2 Some of them may even be in conflict with each other. 
The focus in what follows is mostly on Aristotle’s contributions and their 
relevance. Let me just state here, that action research as I see it, is not just 
applied social science, and neither is it most cogently construed as a separate 
discourse or even “paradigm”, parallel to (and out of touch with) other dis-
courses and approaches of social research. The fundamentally important and 
for social science transformative move made by action research in the 1940s, 
inspired by Kurt Lewin and John Dewey, was twofold. It was the double step 
of a) moving experimentation from segregated laboratories into the different 
fields of social life, and, even more radically, b) inviting the subjects of re-
search to join the community of researchers in the primary interpretation of 
findings, thereby initiating the gradual deterioration and removal of the divi-
sion line between the knowers and the known. This move was motivated not 
merely from democratic convictions and ideology, but just as much from a 
conviction that it would strengthen the validity of social research. Action re-
search could and should be developed and justified through solving inner 
contradictions, tensions, impasses, and unfulfilled expectations in social re-
search as it is institutionalised and practised in the modern era, i.e. as an im-
manent and transformative critique. In fact, action research could and should 
be seen as a latent and usually too tacit dimension emerging from within the 
practices of mainstream social research. The point is to bring this out, to 
make it explicit.3
Even though I definitely believe phrónêsis is an important concept and an 
important practice to excel in for action researchers (and others), many cur-
rent attempts at using it are somewhat misguided by isolating phrónêsis too 
much from the rest of Aristotle’s philosophy, and from his thinking as a 
whole. These attempts often result in a one-sided and therefore unfair and un-
justified interpretation of Aristotle, not only because his theoretical philoso-
phy gives important context and depth to his practical philosophy, but be-
cause very significant and clarifying remarks for ethics and politics are 
2  See e.g. O’Hanlon (1996), Toulmin/Gustavsen (1997), Hollingsworth (1997), 
McTaggart (1997), Reason/Bradbury (2001), Winter/Munn-Giddings (2001), Day et 
al. (2002). 
3  See Eikeland (1985a, 1995, 2001, 2006a). Cf. also Argyris (1980). 
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spread all over his work. But even more importantly, the one-sided interpreta-
tion also often results in, or goes with, a) being practice-oriented in an insuf-
ficient way, and in b) an equally one-sided and therefore erroneous criticism 
of the theoretical ambitions and potentials of both action research and social 
research in general. As already indicated, these aspects are dealt with in more 
detail in Eikeland (2007). But action research cannot and should not be iden-
tified with or attach itself to phrónêsis in separation and even isolation from 
other forms of knowledge or intellectual activities, neither as they are de-
scribed by Aristotle, nor in general. 
There are what we may call “epistemic impulses” in everyday practices, 
which Aristotle utilised extensively in his philosophy, but which easily get 
neglected by an isolated and separate focus on phrónêsis.4 Action research 
and social research in general, would profit much by connecting to and de-
veloping these impulses. In my opinion, the greatest potential for action re-
search and for social research in general, lies not so much in retaining 
phrónêsis alone, while separating off from and abandoning all kinds of “epis-
temic” knowledge forms and theoretical ambitions for research through one 
unqualified sweep. It lies rather in a thorough transformation of epistemic 
and theoretical ambitions, as they are very often understood within a modern 
framework for science and research, and in giving phrónêsis its place and 
space within this transformed scheme. For details of this transformed scheme 
I have to refer to Eikeland (2007), however, while this article can only pre-
sent pointers and indicators. It has been repeated often, at least since Rapa-
port (1970), that action research aims to contribute both to everyday practical 
concerns and to the goals of social science. I agree, but I would add, hardly 
without changing or transforming both. Both everyday practices and social 
science have to be modified and transformed in order for this potential to be 
realized. Action research is not simply an instrumental servant to contempo-
rary everyday or scientific practices as they are. Neither is phrónêsis.
4  Members of the so-called Erlangen school in Germany, continuing in the footsteps of 
Hugo Dingler’s (1881-1954) philosophy, have discussed epistemic impulses like these 
for many years under the designation of “proto-sciences”. See for example the sum-
mary by Peter Janich (1992). 
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The philosophy of Aristotle is not only relevant for action research. We 
might as well consider most of it a result and an example of action research, 
since, in at least two ways, Aristotle’s approach has clear similarities to ac-
tion research as this has developed since the late 1940s. First, the aim of his 
so called practical philosophy (ethics and politics) is to change and develop 
individuals and communities, to improve them, and cultivate virtue or excel-
lence in both. As suggested in Eikeland (1997), there are basic similarities 
stretching from the Hippocratic tradition, through Socrates, Plato, and Aris-
totle, to the subsequent sceptical philosophers. In spite of obvious differ-
ences, they were either part of or had close affinities with ancient empirical 
medicine, they all emphasized acquired practical experience (empeiría), they 
were all sceptical of a) sense perception as the basis and origin of knowledge, 
and of b) both artificial rhetoric and competitive ways of speaking appropri-
ate to the marketplace. They all emphasized the importance of a non-
competitive, reflective conversational mode – dialogue, or dialectic – among 
“professionals”. In the Eudemian Ethics (1215a9) Aristotle even claims that 
every inquiry (pasan sképsin) – including theoretical inquiries – should be di-
rected towards clarifying how it is possible to live well (eu kaì kalôs zên). His 
whole philosophy was geared to develop and cultivate excellence in every 
field. Excellence in ethics and politics is not the same as technical excellence, 
however. The beginning of Book IV in the Politics (1288b10-1289a25) con-
tains a program that most action researchers could recognize, stating what the 
serious student of politics should know in order to help different forms of 
constitutions establish, preserve, develop, or change themselves, and what 
constitutions are suitable for different circumstances and occasions. As indi-
cated by e.g. Klosko (1986: 14) and Bodéüs (1993) the philosophical schools 
of Plato and Aristotle were more like training grounds for future statesmen 
and advisers for rulers than disengaged observatories of distant, external phe-
nomena (including others and society). 
Secondly, and even more importantly, Aristotle’s theoretical philosophy is 
based not so much on “empirical observation” (and certainly not on fanciful 
“speculation”) in a modern sense, as on the acquired, practical experience of 
the inquirer-knower-thinker-reader. Aristotle was, of course, also a pioneer of 
empirical research in a more modern sense, but basically his thinking is a 
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practitioner’s thinking. While modern social science has abhorred “participa-
tion”, I believe Aristotle’s main view was that it is impossible to be truly 
“scientific” or “epistemic” without participating, or even “going”, or rather 
“being, and staying native”, in a certain sense. Both of these ways are impor-
tant aspects in my opinion, which action research at least has to attend to. As 
these points indicate, then, Aristotle’s relevance for action research is neither 
that he deliberates phronetically in his works (since he does not), nor is it his 
analysis of phrónêsis in isolation (since it is not isolated). 
In what follows, I will deal in outline with several challenges in the inter-
pretation of phrónêsis: First, I will discuss the relationship between the ethi-
cal and the intellectual aspect of phrónêsis. In order to do that, I have to bring 
in other ethical and intellectual virtues as well. I will also discuss briefly the 
relation between ends and means, and the relation between general knowl-
edge and knowledge of particulars in the Aristotelian concept of phrónêsis.
Finally I will discuss the relation of phrónêsis to other ways of using lógos or 
reasoned speech, including rhetoric and dialectics. This will indicate that al-
though phrónêsis is very important, other aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy 
are even more important for action research. Phrónêsis is necessary but insuf-
ficient. Even the importance of phrónêsis emerges fully only in this wider 
context, a context which cannot be unfolded fully in an article like this how-
ever (cf. Eikeland 1997, 2007).
Much of the current interest for phrónêsis springs from the efforts of Mar-
tin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Gadamer (1960: 295-307) made 
phrónêsis a model for his own conception of hermeneutics, interpretation, 
and application (appropriation / Anwendung) of tradition. In this context I 
will not review the broad renaissance for the concept, however. Within action 
research, phrónêsis has been approached several times rather cautiously over 
the last two decades, as an interesting and promising concept to bring into the 
action research discourse. It is mentioned en passant by Fals Borda (1991: 
156), and by Greenwood/Levin (1998: 111). But none of them elaborate or 
discuss it, although Greenwood/Levin characterize it with words like “rea-
soning in action and local reflections by participants on their actions”, “a dif-
ferent type of knowledge from that used to develop scientific theories”, and 
quoting Stephen Toulmin, “the ability to spot the action called for in any 
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situation”. Before presenting my own interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of 
phrónêsis I will review a few attempts in English at approaching phrónêsis
by people who seem especially relevant for current action research. This will 
clarify in a preliminary way how and where my view of both phrónêsis and 
action research differs from those reviewed. After presenting my interpreta-
tion of Aristotle I return to a discussion about action research. 
A philosopher defending action research 
Action research has gained some friends among prominent philosophers of 
science over the last decades. The most prominent is perhaps Stephen Toul-
min (1996a, b/c). Unfortunately, however, neither his characterization of Ar-
istotle nor of action research are in my opinion quite adequate. In defending 
action research, Toulmin starts out by criticizing what he calls “Platonic sci-
ence” applying (or approximating) mathematical models in explaining and 
deducing consequences, as the ideal scientific (epistemic) method, also in 
ethics and practical affairs. It is not hard to agree in general with this critique 
of the exaggerated pretensions on behalf of such a “Platonic” model. But in 
general, Aristotelian epistêmê is not like this. Toulmin, however, seems to be-
lieve that Aristotle operates with the same concept of epistêmê as he attrib-
utes to Plato, and he also seems somehow to leave this “Platonic model” 
alone as a valid model for basic science. The implication is, anyhow, that this 
(Platonic and / or basic science) is not what action research is or should be. 
But I think action research should be basic research, only not the “Platonic” 
kind apparently reserved for basic research by Toulmin. 
Toulmin’s defence of action research is based on an almost total dichot-
omy between this “Platonic” epistêmê, and phrónêsis. According to this de-
fence, action research belongs in the latter camp, while most mainstream so-
cial research has tried to become members of the former. In spite of his mobi-
lisation of many interesting parallel cases – primarily from clinical medicine 
and anthropology – to justify and defend action research as a discipline using 
phrónêsis rather than epistêmê, Toulmin in my opinion ends up with insuffi-
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cient characterizations of action research as well.5 He claims (1996a: 3, c: 59) 
that action research, like clinical medicine seeks phrónêsis, not epistêmê
(theoretical grasp). But to say that clinical medicine seeks phrónêsis (1996a: 
3) is not quite accurate, and certainly not the whole story. Toulmin seems to 
confuse phrónêsis with deliberation (boúleusis) as described by Aristotle. 
But phrónêsis includes more than mere deliberation, and so does medicine. 
Secondly, to assimilate action research to clinical medicine is not accurate ei-
ther, since it emphasizes still another dichotomy between experts and clients 
(1996c: 61), which it was important for Aristotle to overcome in his discus-
sions about phrónêsis and ethics. 
Transcending this dichotomy and others as well, is, should, and must be 
important for action research too. “For action researchers to ignore their (the 
workers’) opinions would be like a doctor ignoring the patient’s own state-
ment of his or her symptoms”, Toulmin says. But so it would for most inter-
pretive social research using qualitative methods. And action researchers are 
hardly like doctors. Neither are action researchers like anthropological par-
ticipant observers (1996c: 55) studying the others. There are many different 
ways of doing action research, as anyone trying to find out knows. But it is 
my claim that if, and I really mean if, the term “action research” is relevant 
for anyone involved in the relations of physicians or anthropologists, it be-
longs “prototypically” to “client-researchers”, to worker-researchers, to any 
native-researchers, practitioner researchers, etc. Action research among 
groups like these is not at all the same as “going native”, however, if that 
means simply accepting all local customs, habits and aims uncritically, and 
becoming like some constructed uncritical, average “das Man” native in Hei-
degger’s sense. Cultures are not unitary, pure, and defined by sharp lines. Na-
tives (workers, nurses, teachers, Norwegians, members of any and all [sub-
]groups or [sub-]cultures) see things differently among themselves, and even 
disagree and criticize each other. All in all Toulmin’s defence of action re-
search ends up (ibid.) dichotomising in very un-Aristotelian ways, claiming 
5  This concerns his descriptions of action research in principle. His lack of critical ex-
amination of actual action research practices is another matter, which I will not discuss 
further here, but he comes dangerously close to saying that whatever is done under the 
label of “action research” is OK, since it is phrónêsis, not epistêmê.
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that the focus of action research is “practice rather than theory”, “particular 
not universal, local not general, timely not eternal, concrete not abstract”. But 
neither phrónêsis nor action research should (or could, or in fact does with 
Aristotle) end up in one of these opposites while excluding the other. 
This general impression is mostly confirmed when reading Jon-
sen/Toulmin (1988) on casuistry. Casuistry would seem to be the more gen-
eral kind of activity Toulmin interprets action research to be. In this book too 
the authors work with simple and universal dichotomies between a “Platonic” 
and geometrical concept of theoretical science on the one hand, which really 
was not Aristotle’s working concept at all, and a “non-theoretical” (in the 
same sense) ethical phrónêsis on the other, discussing single cases. This di-
chotomy, however, does nothing to hold apart the casuistic discussion of sin-
gle cases, which Aristotle several times emphasizes is not his business to per-
form in the Ethics (cf. EN1101a25-27, 1109b13-24, 1110b5-10, 
MM1208a21-b2), from an approach to ethics which actually is his working 
approach in the texts, which is much more theoretical (in a different sense) 
than is usually realised, even if the ultimate aim of ethics and politics is to 
change and develop virtue in citizens. But I will return to this below. Jon-
sen/Toulmin’s presentation of two models of argumentation, one theoretical 
and deductive, the other practical, solving problems in light of previous simi-
lar cases (ibid.: 34-35), just confirms the dichotomies once more. By trying to 
conflate rhetoric, ethics, and dialectics (ibid.: 72-74) into the same model of 
practical argumentation, the distinctions Aristotle actually worked with become 
all but impossible to discern through their text. The most profound way, in 
which Aristotle was practical, even in his most theoretical endeavours, be-
comes totally invisible. But in my opinion, it is really this profound way, more 
than anything else, which action research needs to learn from Aristotle. 
Even though it is not difficult to sympathize with Toulmin’s more recent 
(2001: 2, etc.) concern for “reasonableness” rather than “rationality”, the 
same dichotomies between formal argumentation and rhetoric, abstract theory 
and phrónêsis regulate the presentation (ibid.: 14ff.). But these are not the 
only alternatives, neither as complementary nor as rivals (ibid.: 27, 165, 
168ff.). In this work Toulmin continues his defence of action research as 
well, but maintains the dichotomies (ibid.: 97) of action research as not being 
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directed at producing universal, abstract conceptual systems, but rather at lo-
cal, timely knowledge of particular, concrete situations. Instead of general 
theory, Toulmin seems to put “narratives” of “case histories” (ibid.: 124ff.). 
But whatever merit narratives may have, they do not replace general epis-
temic accounts with Aristotle, as Toulmin still seems to believe (ibid.: 132-
136). As both the Nicomachean Ethics (1181a16-b12) and the Sophistical 
Refutations (183b36-184a10) indicate, Aristotle did not have much positive 
to say about collections of examples. Aristotle’s epistemic alternative was 
neither examples, nor narratives, nor tradition, nor abstract, deductive theory. 
To end up praising uncritically the existing theory-pluralism of the social sci-
ences as an ideal “balance of reason” instead, as Toulmin does (ibid.: 172-
173), seems a rather unpromising result (cf. Eikeland 2006a). 
Making social science matter 
Addressing the current impasse of social research in general, Bent Flyvbjerg 
(2001, 2003) has promoted his own version of “phronetic” social science or 
research from Denmark since the early 1990s, basing it to a large extent and 
most fundamentally on the authority of Aristotle (cf. Flyvbjerg 1991). I have 
no intention of trying to evaluate this approach as a whole here, even though I 
think what is marketed as “phronetic social science” (ibid.: 4) is quite at odds 
with phrónêsis as Aristotle understood it. Flyvbjergs “phronetic researcher”, 
with the ambition to practise social science as phrónêsis, actually boils down 
to a kind of “phronetic” expert advisor, basing his expertise on currently quite 
conventional social research methods, expounded in Chapter nine in 
Flyvbjerg (2001). According to Flyvbjerg (2001: 132), the “phronetic re-
searcher” remains an outsider who “gets close” to the phenomenon or group 
studied “during data collection”, and then “remains close” during the phases 
of data analysis, feedback, and publication of results. What exactly “getting 
and remaining close” means is not explained, although exactly this is what 
most of all needs explanation in order to understand in what way his ap-
proach differs from other approaches, from either qualitative social research 
or action research. This whole expert role for phrónêsis, however, is some-
thing, which in Aristotelian ethical terms would seem to be a contradiction in 
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terms, because of the division of labour between the phronetic researcher and 
the rest. 
All in all Flyvbjerg’s presentation of phrónêsis (2001: 2-4, 53-65), which 
is what really concerns me here, is based on many of the same misunder-
standings as that of Toulmin, plus some additional ones pervading his whole 
text. I will only introduce some of them here. First of all Flyvbjerg conflates 
Aristotelian epistêmê not only with geometry, as Toulmin (mostly) does, but 
with modern natural science as well (ibid.: 56), claiming that it builds on an 
“analytical rationality”, which Flyvbjerg clearly does not like, but which 
really needs some explanation in this context. Flyvbjerg does not provide any 
explanation though, and the conflation with modern natural science is simply 
wrong, even though it constructs a convenient “enemy” to fight. He also 
seems to think (ibid.: 57-59) that it is unique for phrónêsis to be based on, or 
to require, accumulated experience in Aristotle’s thinking, and that this imag-
ined uniqueness is what ensures its grasp of particulars and saves it from be-
coming an epistêmê. But with Aristotle, both epistêmê and tékhnê are quite 
explicitly based on exactly the same kind of experience as phrónêsis, accu-
mulated over time (empeiría). If anything isn’t, it is mathematics because it 
works with abstracts. 
Flyvbjerg also puts forward another unjustified claim that Aristotelian 
phrónêsis is the same as Max Weber’s (1921: 12-13) value rationality (Wer-
trationalität), a claim I find highly dubious, and which at least, once more, 
has to be justified. But no justification or even discussion is presented. 
Phrónêsis is a much more complex concept than the kind of dogmatically di-
rected action, compliant with any given “values” posited without considering 
consequences, which Weber attributes to value rationality. Any one of our 
contemporary fundamentalists acts according to “value rationality”, but 
hardly prudently with phrónêsis. Flyvbjerg seems to equate phrónêsis primar-
ily with a research strategy or methodology alternative to “analytical” and 
epistemic approaches, but Aristotle’s concept is hardly a concept of research 
at all. In addition, the only comparison Aristotle gives between phrónêsis and 
any kind of research is precisely with “analysis” (EN1112b20-25).  
Although Flyvbjerg’s approach would seem to be similar to at least some 
kinds of action research, Flyvbjerg hardly ever even mentions action re-
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search. His only mention (2001: 132/fn.6, 192, 2003: 370) is clearly deroga-
tory claiming without any documentation or discussion that action research in 
general is “simple” and has “gone native”. Action researchers are accused of 
identifying with the people they are studying, and with their perspectives and 
goals, as if the prototypical action researcher simply studies “other people”, 
and as if “people’s” perspectives and goals in general are “simple” or cannot 
be as advanced and differentiated as any social researcher’s, “phronetic” or 
normal. In addition, there is no doubt that Aristotelian phrónêsis is intended 
primarily for “natives”, much more than it is for modern social researchers. 
All in all Flyvbjerg’s views on Aristotle as well as on action research, say 
considerably more about Bent Flyvbjerg than they do about either Aristotle or 
action research. But as already mentioned, evaluating his “phronetic social 
science” as a whole, is not part of my objective here.  
Abandoning techniques 
Thomas Schwandt is another discussant using both phrónêsis and action re-
search to promote his own version of practical philosophy, as a critique of 
mainstream evaluation research mainly. In his latest book (2002: xi) his aim 
is to “recover a sense of evaluation as a practical-moral undertaking rather 
than a modern scientific task”. Evaluation, accordingly, cannot and should 
not be construed as “applied social science”, and neither as some kind of 
“professional practice of experts”. His ambition is (ibid.: 2) to “restore Aris-
totelian notions of praxis and practical competence (phrónêsis) to the centre 
of our way of thinking about evaluation.” Most of his examples throughout 
the book are from action research practices. His main opponent seems to be 
“method” as “technique”, managed by outside experts. Schwandt does not try 
to mix phrónêsis and modern social science, as does Flyvbjerg. His approach 
is not positioned outside immediate practical contexts, neither as “positivist” 
nor as “interpretive” research (1996: 62f.). 
Schwandt definitely resonates better with Aristotle in this, and his project 
is not hard to sympathize with. But still Schwandt’s version dissolves several 
distinctions that are important both to Aristotle, and to current attempts at 
finding ways of cultivating knowledge and competence as well. First of all, 
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Schwandt does not seem to have any alternative concept of “epistêmê”. Even 
though his main opponents are technical approaches (tékhnê), as Toulmin and 
Flyvbjerg he seems to assume that there is only one undifferentiated notion of 
epistêmê, which has been constant since Aristotle until modern natural sci-
ence and today. But as I have already indicated, Aristotle’s main working 
concept of epistêmê is far more “practical”, rendering it possible to be “epis-
temic” in ways hardly imaginable with only this modern concept in mind. 
Schwandt concentrates instead on what is not science, nor presumably, tech-
nique, i.e. on the everyday practices and ways of reasoning of most of us. He 
wants to resist this sphere being conquered by artificial technologies of 
knowledge production and expert management, of which mainstream evalua-
tion research seems to be an example. Schwandt wants to say goodbye com-
pletely to epistemology, and to the whole theory project and theoretic atti-
tude. Even qualitative, interpretive inquiry “remains largely descriptive, ob-
jectifying, and theory focused” (1996: 63) in ways his practical philosophy is 
not, and should be avoided. But although I share his diagnosis of interpretive 
inquiry, I am not so sure it necessitates saying goodbye to all kinds of theory 
or epistemology. 
Hence, leaving “science”, “research” and “theory” behind for a moment, 
to enter the everyday world of practitioners with Schwandt, there are distinc-
tions disappearing which even everyday practitioners could, would and 
should find useful. In Schwandt’s scheme of things (2002: 47-58), trying to 
work out a “science (sic!) of practical philosophy“, any and all distinctions 
between deliberation, rhetoric and dialogue seem to dissolve. Deliberating, 
you have a dialogue with others and the situation you find yourself in, result-
ing in persuasive speech, “the conclusion of which is adopting a proper 
course of action in some particular situation” (ibid.: 53). This may very well 
be, but not according to how Aristotle tried to specify aims and tasks for de-
liberation, dialogue, and rhetoric respectively. For Aristotle these were dis-
tinct ways of using lógos or reasoned speech, not to be confused with each 
other, even though they definitely mesh and overlap. 
Schwandt’s project seems to be the improvement of the rationality of 
practices through the protection of ordinary practices from encroachments 
from “science”, quite understandable, in my opinion, on the background of 
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our current situation. I think, however, that Aristotle’s project was to “ration-
alize” the everyday situation he was confronted with, where rhetoric was 
dominant, with support from the “analytical” and “epistemic” efforts of phi-
losophy, and his discussion of phrónêsis was part of this effort. The differ-
ence hinges mainly on the concept of epistêmê. What was apparent for Aris-
totle but not, it would seem, for Schwandt, is that we do not have to defend 
neither detached spectator-epistemologies, nor technical-manipulative meth-
ods of inquiry, in order for any theoretic or epistemic project to be meaning-
ful. In fact the founder of epistemology did not. Theôría was not just specula-
tion and calculation from a separate and insulated observatory (where dis-
tance, “getting close” or “remaining distant”, is totally irrelevant and indif-
ferent). With Aristotle it meant something like studying for the purpose of 
understanding and truth, without intervening, and without the study being 
subordinated to or serving to promote any immediate plans for action of any 
kind. It did not necessarily mean studying strange (or estranged) phenomena 
from a distant and disengaged spectator position, however. On the contrary, 
acquired, practical, participant experience (empeiría) was necessary. 
Schwandt seems to think, with Toulmin and Flyvbjerg, that this kind of ex-
perience was something uniquely required for phrónêsis, but not for tékhnê or 
epistêmê (2002: 49, 106, 115). But, although not exactly the other way 
around, there is definitely more to it. 
In conclusion, Schwandt seems to throw away from his own thinking 
what for Aristotle were the most important things of all, in both practice and 
theory, i.e. a) theôría; studying in order to gain general competence and in-
sight, not just in order to fix some immediate action, and b) skholê, free space 
and time, relieved from immediate action requirements. One would think that 
Schwandt needs these as well, in order to do what he does in thinking and 
writing about practices. But the necessary space to accommodate this need 
has not been incorporated sufficiently into his own thinking. Aristotle knew 
that even the improvement of the rationality of practices needs this, only not
as separate, insulated, distant observatories, populated by full-time professors 
and students (either positivist, or interpretive) without practical experience, 
visiting short-time or part-time only, to get close enough for observing and 
explaining. Leisure (skholê) is needed in order to develop virtue or virtuosity 
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in any field (Pol1329a1-3). But what was and is needed is theôría and skholê
embedded in practical contexts. To sort this out properly, distinctions like 
those between rhetoric, didactics, dialogue, phrónêsis, and deliberation be-
came important in the thinking of Aristotle. It seems to me that the irony in 
the efforts at escaping from the maze of modern social “science” comes full 
circle when Schwandt enlists the arch-epistemic and anti-rhetoric figure 
above all in his anti-epistemic expedition, i.e. Socrates himself, “as interlocu-
tor and teacher” (2002: 56). I agree that Socrates is needed, but I am not cer-
tain if Schwandt and I would agree exactly on why and how to employ him.  
The authors above write as if there only existed two opposite and recipro-
cally excluding alternatives to choose between for action research and others 
interested in learning from Aristotle. Although somewhat differently con-
ceived, apparently either we have to be Cartesian, deductive, mathematical, 
empiricist, technical, etc., or we have to resort to rhetorical, everyday, on-the-
run-practical, ad hoc problem-solving ways of knowing. But the Aristotelian 
scheme cannot be reduced to these two alternatives. Other options are avail-
able, although neither independent nor excluding each other. What for Aris-
totle was specifically dialogical or dialectical, gets ripped apart and invisible 
in this dichotomous thinking. It is as if the only alternatives were either Aris-
totle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics, or his Art of Rhetoric, with phrónêsis
enlisted on the side of rhetoric. But this is a false, unnecessary, and un-
Aristotelian dichotomy. We cannot choose one side alone, and these are not 
the only alternatives anyhow. The authors consequently neglect commenting 
on, and even noticing at all, two major intellectual virtues; nous, often trans-
lated as “intelligent intuition”, and sophía (theoretical wisdom), and the same 
goes for lesser ones like “understanding of particulars” or súnesis, and others 
as well. Hence, these ways of dichotomising simply miss the complexity and 
richness of both Aristotle and the world confronting us.6
6  Joseph Dunne (1993) has also delivered a very interesting study of phrónêsis and ték-
hnê in Aristotle. My main objection to his interpretation concerns his attempt at rede-
fining the role of phrónêsis, based mostly on Dunnes lack of concern with the theo-
retical aspects of the philosophy of Aristotle. Others do not focus on phrónêsis in par-
ticular, but emphasize other selected and limited aspects of Aristotle’s practical think-
ing as most important, e.g. Ramírez (1995) who sees rhetoric as the most basic disci-
pline, and Janik (1996) who seems to consider the practical syllogism as the core of 
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The virtues – non-dichotomous thinking:
Ethical and intellectual aspects of phrónêsis 
So, what is phrónêsis? According to Aristotle, phrónêsis is one of the “intellec-
tual virtues” or “excellences of the mind” (aretai dianoêtikai). But phrónêsis is 
not only an intellectual virtue. It is an ethical virtue as well (EN1140b25, 
MM1197a14-20). Aristotle claims that we cannot be (intellectually) prudent 
(phrónimoi) without being (ethically) good (EN1144a36, 1178a16-19, 
EE1246b33). Hence, phrónêsis presupposes ethical virtue. But simultaneously, 
ethically virtuous acts presuppose phrónêsis. We cannot act virtuously without 
exercising phrónêsis. Except for theoretical wisdom (sophía), which is said to 
be a part of virtue as a whole (EN1144a5), the other intellectual virtues are not 
given intrinsic ethical value, since they as rational powers (dunámeis), appar-
ently can be used for both good and bad (ethical) purposes. 
The Greek concept of “virtue” (aretê) means in general what makes any 
thing or activity work at its best (áristos).7 The virtue of an eye or a horse or 
any other thing is the specific state or condition that makes it perform its task 
or function (érgon) well. In Aristotelian terms an ethical or intellectual virtue 
in human beings is a héxis, or habitus (the Latin translation), which means an 
acquired ability, skill, habit, or incorporated disposition for acting and feeling 
in certain ways, resulting from practice, exercise, or habituation, as Aristotle 
points out.8 A habitus can be either bad or good, but virtue is the best habitus
within its kind of activity. Every ethical and intellectual virtue or aretê is the 
result of a process of perfection (teleíôsis) from within a specific activity or 
Aristotle’s practical philosophy. Other contributors, as for instance Forester (1999), 
are definitely also action research relevant. He writes much about both deliberation 
and practical judgement as well, but with references to Aristotle only indirectly, 
mostly through Martha Nussbaum’s interpretations. The same goes for Polkinghorne 
(2004), who, in addition, also misjudges the epistemic and theoretical parts of Aris-
totle’s philosophy in line with Toulmin and Flyvbjerg. I will not bring contributions 
like these directly into my discussion here, for reasons of space. 
7  EN1106a15-26, EE1218b38-1219a23 
8  See Cat8b25-9a13, 12a26-13a37, EN1103a16-26, 1103b22, 1114a10, EE1220b1 &18-
20. The concept habitus has gained great influence in modern social science through 
Pierre Bourdieu’s (1972/1980) appropriation of it from the scholastic tradition. See 
Broady (1990: 236ff.) for documentation. 
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practice, resulting in a certain virtuous habitus.9 This means that for every 
thing and every activity that has some task or function, there exists a virtuous 
habitus in every performing “entity” as a condition that makes it able to per-
form that task or function in the best possible way. The virtues are neither 
written nor unwritten rules or commandments. Nor are they merely “atti-
tudes”. The modern word “virtuosity” actually carries the original meaning 
better than “virtue”, since it is more activity-oriented than attitude-oriented. 
This aspect is actually quite important to Aristotle. This is why “excellence” 
also may be a better translation than the somewhat worn out modern concept 
of virtue. In spite of this I will mostly continue to use “virtue” here. 
The intellectual virtues 
For Aristotle, as well as for Plato, the activity of the intellect or mind – think-
ing (dianoeisthai or nóêsis) – is lingual, i.e. it consists in the (internal or ex-
ternal) use of language or reasoned speech (lógos).10 The common work, 
task, or function (érgon) of all the intellectual virtues is to attain truth by af-
firming and denying, as Aristotle puts it (EN1139a18-31, 1139b12-17, 
EE1221b27-34). The different intellectual virtues have, or rather are, lógos in 
this proper sense and in themselves (kuríôs kaì en hautô) (EN1103a2-3). It is 
their lógos-character that makes these virtues intellectual. They all consist in 
the ability to use lógos correctly for their purpose, and this (i.e. “correctly”) is 
what makes them virtuous. Phrónêsis is a virtue in using lógos in certain 
ways for certain purposes. 
In order to get the picture quickly and see the place of phrónêsis within it, 
I have to give short and too simplified characterisations of the most important 
intellectual virtues. The virtues I will bring into this discussion beside 
phrónêsis are the following, all in quotation marks since these traditional 
translations anticipate the content, sometimes in biased and confusing ways: 
“theoretical wisdom” (sophía), “intuitive intelligence” or “intellectual intui-
tion” (nous), “science” (episteme), “technical reason” (tékhnê), “understand-
9  EN1103a26, Ph246a10-248a9, Metaph1021b21, EE1220a22-b10 
10  See deAn427b15, 428a23-25, 432a12, SE170b12-20, Int16a1ff., EN1139a21-32, 
1139b11-17, EE1221b29-32.
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ing of particulars” (súnesis), “cleverness” (deinótês), and “quickness of 
mind” (eustokhía). These virtues are not separate “parts” of the mind, how-
ever. There are several overlaps that are too complex to bring into this pres-
entation, however. At the base of all of them lies gradually acquired, practical 
experience (empeiría ? German Erfahrung ? Erlebnis) (cf. Eikeland, 1997; 
2007). The virtues are identified according to the different kinds of activities 
and tasks (érga) of the mind and their excellences or perfected forms. The 
virtues differ in their task structures, in what they relate to, in what they do 
and pursue, in how they do it, and for what purpose. This is how virtues or 
excellences of different activities are distinguished. 
Sophía (theoretical wisdom) is said to be part of virtue as a whole. It en-
compasses all the virtues, both intellectual and ethical, and is considered by 
Aristotle to be at the head of the others. The head is part of the body, how-
ever. Bodies should not be beheaded. Theoretical wisdom is said to be com-
posed of two virtues immediately “below” it, nous and epistêmê. These both 
relate to and deal with things that are (more or less) stable and invariant. Al-
though I find it somewhat misleading, nous is usually translated as some kind 
of intuitive intelligence or intellectual intuition. Nous moves inductively, 
“upwards” from particulars, but grasping and defining principles. But it deals 
with both universals and particulars. Epistêmê is usually translated as “sci-
ence”, but should not in general be identified with modern science. Epistêmê
is the virtue of theoretical knowledge after competence in some field or activ-
ity has been stabilised and analysed, has received a defined and more or less 
“finished form”, and can be articulated adequately in language. It concerns 
those aspects of its field of study that remain more or less stable independ-
ently of our actions or interventions. It is primarily a skill in deductive dem-
onstration (héxis apodeiktikê), and in didactics or the instructive lecturing of 
teachers (lógos didaskalikós). It starts and moves “down” from basic princi-
ples. But although epistêmê consists of words, it cannot in general be reduced 
to words alone. Nor is it simply formal and syllogistic. It implies personally 
embodied skill and substantial knowledge as its base. 
Both phrónêsis and tékhnê concern things that can, and do, vary 
(EN1139a7-16, 1140a1, MM1197a2-13). And, maybe more importantly, 
since natural science also concern things that change and vary naturally, 
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phrónêsis and tékhnê concern things that we ourselves can control, i.e. decide 
on, choose, initiate, change, develop, or stop, so that the change and variation 
depends on us. They are both prescriptive and give recommendations on ac-
tion. But phrónêsis and tékhnê work in quite different ways. Phrónêsis delib-
erates, tékhnê calculates. Although Aristotle’s comment in the Nicomachean
Ethics (1139a13) opens up the interpretation for deliberation, he simultane-
ously conflates the distinction between deliberation and calculation. But the 
wider context implies difference. Phrónêsis and tékhnê also differ between 
themselves by being assigned as rational virtues or excellences to different 
forms of activities. Phrónêsis is assigned to praxis or “doing”, i.e. to activi-
ties having their ends and objectives within themselves, as with acts of jus-
tice, or more generally with processes of perfection. Tékhnê is assigned to 
poíêsis or “making”, having as its aim the production of change in external 
objects, or bringing into existence things that may or may not exist. In praxis
ends and means – beginning, middle, and end – are formally identical. Acting 
justly you realise justice, and practising as a novice is formally identical to 
performing as a virtuoso. In poíêsis however, ends and means are formally 
different, and the end is always some externalised product, never the activity 
of poíêsis in itself. 
In a way, tékhnê is the application of epistemic knowledge of “high regu-
larity” in creating changes induced by us (APo100a8-9), where the applica-
tion of a cause of a certain kind will predictably produce the same chain of 
causes and effects regularly. This is done with the use of lógos – reasoning 
and arguing – by the technicians in a certain phase, deliberating what to do – 
i.e. in finding and applying the right stimulus as a cause – and then in calcu-
lating the ultimate effect as the result of a chain of predetermined causes and 
effects in the objects concerned. But it is done without any use of lógos in 
persuading or convincing the manipulated or influenced object itself to react 
in certain ways, or in showing and giving it reasons and justifications for 
choosing, acting, or reacting in certain ways – explaining it why. Purely ma-
terial things do not need, and are unable to receive that. Their operational 
mode is, in Aristotelian terms, efficient and material causes. But for tékhnê
the other is a thing (possessing a mind or not), used as a predictable or con-
trollable tool or as material. If speech is used technically, it is used as an in-
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fluencing power, where the effect is what counts, not the validity of the intel-
lectual, cognitive content of something said and communicated. Understand-
ing in the recipient has nothing, or only accidentally something, to do with it. 
Tékhnê does not speak to the object it manipulates or influences as to an 
autonomous mind like itself, persuading, convincing, or showing it how and 
why to act in certain ways. Phrónêsis does. Tékhnê as such hardly deals with 
particulars or individuals through deliberation, as phrónêsis does. Tékhnê cal-
culates effects, on humans as well as on other objects 
Súnesis – understanding of particulars – is another intellectual virtue. It is 
not prescriptive like phrónêsis, but neither is it merely the same as to have an 
opinion (dóxa). Everyone has opinions, but not everyone has understanding. 
Nor is súnesis restricted to universals, the way epistêmê is. When we make up 
our minds about what another individual says, by distinguishing well in what 
s/he says, either in learning an epistêmê, or in judging what phrónêsis is 
about – merely interpreting it, as we might say – then we engage our súnesis,
not our phrónêsis (EN1143a12-35). Súnesis is needed as presupposed knowl-
edge in listening to lectures (APo71a7&13), and in dialogue with others (e.g. 
Metaph1062a12, Top160a17-34). The most important, and distinguishing, 
common property of both phrónêsis and súnesis appears to be this specific 
knowledge of the concrete situation, the specific particulars of and in this 
situation and context. The difference, however, is that phrónêsis is normative 
and is directed at promoting action, while súnesis is merely descriptively and 
analytically distinguishing (kritikê mónon). It merely observes differences 
critically, engendering knowledge about particulars, without intervening, de-
siring, pursuing, or preferring one or another alternative practically. It is 
about things that can vary and be different, while epistêmê is about things 
that do not vary, or are stable for the most part. 
Still another intellectual virtue is mere cleverness or deinótês. Delibera-
tion distinguishes phrónêsis from the virtues presented so far. In this it also 
differs from a kind of “quickness of mind”, or wit (eustokhía), which “sees” 
the “what”, “why” and “how” of situations, immediately, without inquiry or 
reasoning (EN1142a32-b6, APo89b10-20). Phrónêsis is not mere quick-
wittedness. Phrónêsis deliberates, and deliberation is slow, while quick-
wittedness is swift. But phrónêsis only deliberates about means, not ends. 
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Deliberation as a whole is about means, not ends, according to Aristotle (cf. 
EN1112a18-1113a9, EE1226b10-1228a22). And cleverness deliberates too. 
Cleverness is the capacity to deliberate well about means to any, arbitrary 
end, far-sighted, near-sighted, selfish, evil, whatever. Deinótês, then, is for 
“smart guys”. Cleverness seems to be what modernity, at least since David 
Hume (1739-40: 413-418/457-459), has tended to see as rationality simplic-
iter, a technical instrument, and a servant, of an emotionally (or a-rationally) 
regulated will (“the slave of the passions”). Cleverness works as phrónêsis
does, taking particulars of the here-and-now into consideration, but for any 
“practical” purpose whatever. So, although phrónêsis deliberates, every de-
liberation is not phrónêsis. Although deliberation is concerned with particu-
lars, every concern with particulars is not deliberative. Deliberation has nor-
mative and prescriptive aims. It is directed towards action, promoting specific 
action. Súnesis is not. And although phrónêsis is concerned with particulars, 
every concern with particulars is not phrónêsis. Súnesis is not. 
Phrónêsis, according to Aristotle, only deliberates about means for realis-
ing ethical virtue (aretê), and “happiness” (eudaimonía) (EN1142b23, 
1144a36) meaning competent, well functioning, flourishing activities. This 
means that if you do not deliberate and act with these ends in mind, what you 
do will be reduced to cleverness. But, surprisingly maybe, phrónêsis does not 
determine or define ends (aims, objectives) for actions in Aristotle’s scheme. 
Ends are given (data) for phrónêsis by the ethical virtues, and this is why, in 
order to be a true phrónimos, you have to be ethically good and virtuous 
(agathós) already (EN1144a36). This relation between ends and means is a 
point repeated very many times by Aristotle, and it seems to have been an 
important point for him.11 It is also a point, which has caused a lot of contro-
versy, doubt, and confusion among commentators, since it threatens 
phrónêsis with immediate collapse into mere cleverness, syllogistic reason-
ing, or dogmatic “value rationality”.12 The restrictions put on phrónêsis also 
11  See EN1111b27, 1112b12, 1112b29-35, 1113a14, 1113b34, 1139a14, 1140b17-20, 
1141b11-12, 1144a7-9, 1144a26-36, 1145a6, EE1226a8, 1226b10, 1226b19, 1227a7, 
MM1189a8-11/26, 1190a1-28, Rh1359a34-b24, 1362a18, Top116b23-117a4. 
12  Cf. Natali (2004: 222/227ff.). This whole discussion deserves a separate treatment at 
least. I cannot free myself from the impression, however, that authors like the follow-
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immediately raise the question about how we become virtuous, since we ap-
parently have to be virtuous first in order to be prudent. But in fact, Aristotle 
seems to insist on this restricted range for phrónêsis, and why this insistence, 
is an interesting question. 
The ethical virtues 
The “ethical virtues”, or rather “excellences of character” (êthikai aretai) do 
not just consist in the use of lógos, as the intellectual virtues do.13 According 
to Aristotle, the ethical virtues are rather concerned with the formation of 
character (êthos) through becoming habituated and accustomed to, and 
thereby gradually avoiding and seeking “spontaneously” or by inclination, 
the “right kinds and amounts” of pleasures and pains in acting and feeling 
(EN1104b9-1105a16, cf. 1121a3). Hence, the ethical virtues require the 
perfection, through practice and habituation, of more than just thinking and 
speaking. Ethical virtue is defined to be in the middle between excess and de-
ficiency. But it is no compromise or average, nor is it simply “moderation”. 
The ethical virtues or excellences of character are called “álogoi” by Aris-
totle, a word often translated as “irrational”. But the ethical virtues are not in 
themselves irrational in the sense of being in any necessary opposition or 
contradiction to reason, or being “beyond” and unattainable by reason. Álogoi
simply means that these excellences do not primarily consist in the use of 
lógos or reasoned speech, but mainly in non-lingual conduct. They are tacit, 
ing take a great effort in trying to explain away Aristotle’s notorious insistence on 
keeping deliberation and phrónêsis restricted to what contributes – here and now – to 
the realization of the ends, without letting them influence the content of, or the theo-
retical clarification of, or even the choice of the ends themselves. See Wiggins (1980), 
Nussbaum (1986: 297ff.), Sherman (1989: 70-94), Cooper (1975: 58ff.) – holding a 
different alternative open though – and Dunne (1993: 350-356). While I agree with 
Natali (2001: 39-61) in restricting deliberation to “means”, we disagree on several im-
portant details in the interpretation of this. Even though I find it quite uncontroversial, 
the expression “concerned with the components of the end”, as well as with instru-
mental means, used by Nussbaum (1978: 170) and others, is not sufficiently clarifying 
about practical reasoning. The “explaining away” of Aristotle’s insistence often ap-
pears to go with a need to apologize for his theoretical project. But Aristotle’s theo-
retical project needs to be understood, not apologized. Aristotle’s theoretical project is 
dealt with in Eikeland (1997) and (2007). 
13  See EN1102a29-1103a10, 1117b23-25, 1139a5, EE1219b26-1220a13, MM1196b12. 
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in Michael Polanyi’s sense (1958/1966). They are not necessarily completely 
“wordless”, but they always consist in more than words and speech, and 
hence, cannot be reduced to words and speech alone. Still, they are able to 
(and must) be guided and influenced by (external or internal) speech, and to 
follow recommendations or instructions given by it. Thus, according to Aris-
totle they do take part in lógos after all, but in a different way (EN1102b13-
1103a3, EE1219b26-1220a13). The central point in this, then, is that these 
tacit abilities and dispositions differ both from clean-cut reason or mind 
(nous), consisting in the use of lógos, on the one hand, and from pure corpo-
real nature (sôma, or sarx), quite unable to become modified directly by 
lógos, on the other hand. They occupy their own proper middle ground in-
between, as properties of the living “ensouled” body (psukhê).
The ethical virtues are said by Aristotle to be with good and articulated 
reason(s), or justifications (metà lógou). This is important since the ethical 
virtues are not only “in accordance with” right reason (katà tòn orthón 
lógon), as some of his contemporaries seem to have defined them. On the 
other hand, the ethical virtues are not in themselves reasons (lógous einai) ei-
ther, or kinds of epistêmê, as Socrates thought. They are dispositions – con-
verted into right action and right emotion – with the right reason (metà tou 
orthou lógou), and phrónêsis is right reason in these matters, according to 
what is said in the Nicomachean Ethics (1144b17-33). The ethical virtues, 
then, are not only “in accordance with” reason, because things can be done in 
a formally correct way “by chance”, technically, or under the influence of 
others (as in mechanical rule-following, or in following orders) (EN1105a17-
b9). On the other hand the ethical virtues are not in themselves reasons, be-
cause they demand right action and emotion, not just abstracted words or 
thoughts. Hence, the final consummation of ethically virtuous action distin-
guishes it from merely doing things a) mechanically, as in following a rule, 
an order, or habit, or, b) unknowingly, meaning not knowing whether and 
why an act is an ethically good act, or, c) coincidentally, by chance, meaning 
not deliberately chosen from an established virtuous disposition or habitus,
or, d) for ulterior motives and not for their own sake.14 As an intellectual vir-
14  EN1105a17-b12, 1109b35-1112a17, 1135a20-b11, 1144a13-23, MM1197b37-1198a21. 
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tue, then, phrónêsis has ethical import. But as this shows, the ethical virtues 
in and by themselves also have what seems to be an intellectual aspect to 
them. Being ethically virtuous appears somehow to imply knowing and un-
derstanding what ethical virtue (aretê) and “happiness” (eudaimonía) are as 
competent, well functioning, flourishing activities. Adjusting to particulars of 
the situation is not arbitrary. 
Several other aspects of the virtues as Aristotle sees them, need to be 
mentioned. As indicated, ethical virtues, like temperance, courage, justice, 
friendship, and others, are defined as a mean (méson) between excess and de-
ficiency. But the ethical mean is not a compromise, some kind of mediocrity, 
or uncritical “moderation”, not taking the effort of doing everything possible. 
It obviously is not a statistical mean, or average, either. Doing the right thing 
ethically is compared to hitting the centre of a target (EN1106a26-1107a8). 
In relation to “the best” and “goodness” then, virtue is considered an extreme 
(akrótês).15 Aristotle suggests that virtue is more accurate and better than any 
technical art (EN1106b10-15, 1100b11-17), and that it is like a work of art 
where nothing can be added or subtracted without ruining its perfection. An 
ethically virtuous act hits even a moving target in the middle, period. 
In a way, the ethical virtues are at one (top) end of a continuous, vertical 
spectrum of opposites within themselves or their kind of activity. At the other 
(bottom) end are vices, which really are incompetences. Within the spectrum 
of virtues and vices, each of the virtues have in a sense two opposites, excess 
and deficiency, which are both vices. So if virtue is on top of a hierarchy be-
cause it is an excellence and an “extreme” among contraries, it stands on top 
of two separate spiral staircases below, excess and deficiency, both of them 
with vices at their lower ends, representing the other extremes.16 In general, 
virtues are also continuous, not discontinuous. There are many intermediate 
qualities and “states”. These intermediate states are not to be confused with 
the ethical mean (tò méson), however, since the ethical mean actually is the 
extreme of being “completely good”. The intermediate states are like steps in 
15  See EN1107a8&23, 1123b13-15, EE1220b31-35, and Metaph1078a32. 
16  See the list in EE1220b38-1221a12. Cf. Cat13b36-14a7, EN1107a1-6, 1108b11-
1109a19, 1133b29-1134a12. See also EN 1107a9-27 on acts and emotions in them-
selves evil. 
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the two spiral staircases. Being in the middle (tò méson) of the target, ethical 
virtues have two (or even more) contraries. 
Another characteristic is also used by Aristotle to identify ethical virtues. 
In the arts and sciences, a voluntary error is not as bad as an involuntary er-
ror. A voluntary error simply shows that you are in control technically as a 
master of the art, as when a virtuoso singer or pianist slips out of tune on pur-
pose. But in ethics, i.e. when performing acts with ethical import, and for vir-
tuous action including phrónêsis, a voluntary mistake is worse than an invol-
untary mistake.17 A voluntary mistake would imply e.g. inflicting a premedi-
tated injustice on somebody, or consciously not bothering to find out any-
thing about the special background of someone before judging. Doing this is 
worse than doing the same “not-on-purpose”. If you really know and under-
stand medicine, or any other art or science, you are de facto considered to be a 
doctor, no matter how you use it. But really knowing and understanding what 
justice is, does not automatically make you into a just person, and if you have a 
thorough knowledge and understanding of justice, but do not even attempt to 
act justly, it makes you even more unethical than being inactive or a perpetrator 
without the knowledge or understanding (cf. MM1183b8-17, 1199a19-29). In-
justice is not the same as ignorance (Top114b9-13) since the injustice increases 
when unjust acts are done with knowledge, and just acts can be done even 
without knowledge. In matters of emotion and practice, words are often less 
convincing than deeds, as Aristotle points out (EN1172a35-b1). 
According to Aristotle, external goods like wealth, health, strength, 
friends, etc., and all merely rational capacities or “powers” (dunámeis), arts 
and crafts (tekhnai), and “sciences” (epistêmai), can be used for both good 
and bad purposes. Good things like these can obviously be (ab-)used for bad 
purposes. They can all easily be forfeited by fools or by unwise decisions. 
Rational capacities study subjects that are, as it were, spread out, as what we 
may call horizontal opposites, before them. Medicine as an art and science, 
for example, carries the potential of – or power over – both health and disease 
17  See EN1140b23-24. Cf. 1116b3-23, 1135b25-1136a5, 1136b3-5, 1137a10-26, 1138a8-9. 
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(“un-health”), since it studies them both and can produce both.18 So, the use 
must be controlled by an ethically good will. Hence, skills like these are not 
ethically good in themselves. Whether they are used for good or bad purposes 
depends on the character and choice of the user. But both these kinds of 
goods and the rational capacities remain what they are in themselves, qua
goods and powers, no matter what purpose they are used, or not used, for. It 
is possible to be an evil doctor, while remaining technically skilled and fully 
competent. Both health and wealth remain good things, even if ruined by 
fools or abused by evil owners. In other words, goods like these are instru-
ments (EN1099a31-b8, 1099b28, cf. Pol1332a19-28), or enabling powers, 
with no necessary, intrinsic, or immanent relation to one specific ethical pur-
pose or aim within the scope of the subjects they study. 
This is not so with the proper ethical virtues. They are not mere instru-
ments. Ethical virtues cannot be used for bad ethical purposes. Purely techni-
cal virtues, however, can be used for bad ethical purposes, and as just indi-
cated, even for bad and incompetent performance. Justice, for instance, can-
not be used for unjust purposes according to Aristotle, and neither can 
phrónêsis.19 For Aristotle this is one way of identifying ethical virtues. Ethi-
cal virtues produce what Aristotle calls noble actions (kalà érga), which are 
laudable (epainetá) in themselves, and as ends. They are done for their own 
sake, not only as means for something else. They are forms of praxis. They 
are also laudable and praiseworthy because it is up to us to perform them or 
not, they are not due to chance, luck, necessity, force, or other external causes 
influencing. We decide and we are responsible, and for that reason we praise 
those who make virtuous decisions. Justice, or “just-ness” as a virtue of an 
individual, necessarily produces just actions, and just actions are independent 
ends, not something done for ulterior motives, to achieve something else, 
since to use justice for other purposes at least raises serious doubt as to 
whether it really is justice at work, not something else. External goods 
(wealth, health, strength, etc.), however, can be used for any purpose without 
18  Cf. Metaph1046a36-b28, 1050b28-35, 1051a4-22, 1047b31-1048a24, EN1129a12-23, 
EE1227a23-b5
19  See EE1246a27-b36, Rh1355b2-3, EN1129a12-16, 1105b19-1106a13, MM1206b8-29 
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losing credibility as good instruments. The results or use of enabling, instru-
mental powers like health, wealth, or strength are not in themselves praise-
worthy. Their character as praiseworthy or not depends on the purposes of 
their users (EE1248b17-37). But health, wealth, etc. are still considered 
goods independently of the purposes of their owners. In the ethical virtues, 
the good purpose of the agent is included in the definition, making them into 
a special kind of goods. 
For Aristotle, this indicates how the ethical virtues cannot be reduced to 
an intellectual level of knowledge and technical competence, as Socrates 
seems to have thought (EN1145b21-31). The facts of “weakness-of-will”, 
self-indulgence, unrestraint, or incontinence (akrasía) on the one hand, and 
self-control, restraint, or continence (egkráteia) on the other, discussed exten-
sively in Book VII in the Nicomachean Ethics, where emotions, desires, and 
habits are in conflict with reasoned conviction and knowledge, also indicate 
that ethics has more to it than mere knowledge and technical competence. But 
phrónêsis is not only an intellectual virtue of reasoned speech alone. To forget 
something purely intellectually held (or merely technically performed) is not 
considered an ethical deficiency. But forgetting phrónêsis would be (as would 
forgetting about justice!). Through properties like these, then, phrónêsis is dis-
tinguished as a different form of knowledge from the other intellectual virtues 
(génos állo gnôseôs), having a truly ethical import in itself.20
Since phrónêsis is a rational (ethical) virtue, without which other natural 
(ethical) virtues cannot be perfected, it also follows, according to Aristotle, 
that if a man has phrónêsis he must necessarily have the other virtues as well. 
It makes no sense to talk about phrónêsis separately, alone, without other 
ethical virtues like justice, courage and temperance, since phrónêsis is their 
specific reasoning power when they act with right reason (EN1144b30-
1145a6, 1146a8-10). The other ethical virtues are the bases without which 
phrónêsis cannot exist either. But this also means that phrónêsis cannot be 
acquired alone, isolated, and independently from other ethical virtues, simply 
reckoning the others will follow automatically as a consequence from focus-
ing solely on phrónêsis. Phrónêsis is nothing without the other ethical vir-
20  See EE1246b36, MM1183b8-17, and Top152b1-5 
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tues. It is simply impossible to separate phrónêsis from the other ethical vir-
tues in this way. We cannot be prudent without being good, but we cannot be 
fully good either without being prudent, taking the particulars of the situation 
into account. 
Phrónêsis and rhetoric 
Rhetoric as Aristotle sees it, is not an ethical virtue in itself, as phrónêsis is. 
Rhetoric is a useful skill (khrêsimos), which can be used for good and bad, 
just and unjust purposes, as can all other merely rational powers. As such, it 
is closer to cleverness, than to phrónêsis. Aristotle speaks unambiguously of 
rhetoric as a tékhnê (1354a1-15, 1355a4, b9-41). As rhetorical performance
the aim of eloquence, persuasion, lies in-between influencing and manipulat-
ing technically on the one hand, and convincing and showing intellectually 
on the other, directed as it is, mainly at moving the soul (psukhê) – as the me-
diator in-between the body (sôma) and the mind (nous) – to some decision, 
action, or emotion, using character-appearance (êthos), emotions (páthos),
and persuasive lógos as means (1356a1-38). If people can be persuaded into 
doing things voluntarily, force and necessity become superfluous (cf. 
EE1224a5-1225a1). But still, the point in using rhetorical art is the wanted 
decision, action, or emotion as an effect in the receiver of persuasion, not his 
or her independent understanding of anything, nor the validity of the con-
tents. Rhetorically considered, both “understanding” in the other and “valid-
ity” of arguments may be useful means for achieving the intended effects. 
But if they are not, rhetoric chooses other means. 
The performance of phrónêsis is not limited to the public arenas (popular 
assemblies, courts of law, and festive occasions) Aristotle assigns to rhetoric, 
of course, but the performance of rhetoric and the activity of phrónêsis still 
overlap significantly. First of all, even rhetoric is not restricted to these are-
nas, but may operate in private spheres (idía) (Rh1358b9), and towards indi-
viduals (1391b10-25). Also, they overlap in being concerned with things 
about which we deliberate (cf. EN1141b30-34, Rh1357a317, 1359a33-b1), 
i.e. events that are not part of natural developments, either necessary or eter-
nal, but may issue in different ways, and where the results depend on our own 
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decisions, efforts, and actions. To put it bluntly, as Aristotle does himself 
(Rh1355a24-34, 1357a2-16, 1404a1-9), rhetoric is primarily necessary be-
cause it aims at the persuasion of simple people, who are hard to teach, and 
unable to follow long chains of argument, where appealing to the mind (nous)
alone is insufficient. And in everyday activities, persuading people like this is 
often necessary, of course, as every PR or advertising consultant knows. But 
rhetoric is also useful because sometimes even defenders of just causes and 
true accounts lose their case, due to their inability to speak clearly and appro-
priately to the point to their audiences, and also because even in teaching it 
matters how things are presented, not ideally maybe, but in fact. So, they both 
need to attend to “techniques of presentation”.  
Phrónêsis is primarily deliberation, done by a prudent phrónimos by and 
for himself, in an open search to find the best means for acting virtuously, 
here and now. It can also be performed in company with others (1112b10-
12). Rhetoric is primarily directed at making assemblies of others decide in 
certain ways by persuading them of the decisions’ correctness, usefulness, 
profitability, or whatever will make them decide as the rhetorical speaker 
wishes. Persuasion can also be performed in smaller circles, or even face to 
face, however. Done either individually or in a group, phrónêsis is required to 
reason correctly for the sake of virtue. Phrónêsis is not simply persuasive. 
Rhetoric does not have such restrictions, however. Rhetoric as a tékhnê may 
use all means of persuasion for all kinds of purposes, virtuous or not 
(1355b8-35). Among the means of persuasion, phrónêsis, as such, can hardly 
use character (êthos) (e.g. I am an honest guy, so I should pay attention to 
myself!) and emotion (páthos) as means, as rhetoric does, in order to move 
ones own mind or soul to a decision (cf. EE1240b4-8), and it may not be 
quite noble to appeal to these in counselling others either. These are undoubt-
edly real means of persuasion, however (Rh1355b16-18). Real means of per-
suasion may include incorrect reasoning processes as well (e.g. arguing from 
signs, and from the “confirmation of the consequent”, cf. SE167b8-20), and 
even true conclusions may be concluded correctly from false premises. 
Rhetoric, then, may very well be useful and necessary for phrónêsis too. But 
it is not identical to it. In Aristotle’s opinion, rhetoric is clearly for the most 
part a derived and subsidiary art, based on, and combining, the more funda-
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mental studies of dialectics / analytics, and ethics / politics. In order to be a 
master of rhetorical arguments, you must first know both syllogisms in gen-
eral (Rh1355a4-21), and the human emotions, characters, and virtues 
(1356a23-38), the study of which none belongs to rhetoric itself, but to the 
other disciplines just mentioned (1359b2-20). As a field of study rhetoric has 
the special task of studying the general means of persuasion, falling outside 
the proper fields of the separate arts and sciences.21
Phrónêsis and tékhnê summarised 
In the end, then, what really distinguishes phrónêsis from other deliberative 
processes (rhetoric, cleverness, or other forms of tékhnê and epistêmê) is its 
ethical content and its immanence to praxis. Phrónêsis is both ethical and in-
tellectual. Why and how? It deliberates about how I or we should and could 
be just, fair, friendly, and caring, etc. in relation to other people here and 
now, people with very different needs and wishes, all things considered, but 
still respecting their autonomy as thinking minds and wills separate from 
ours. Because phrónêsis has to heed appearances through the different opin-
ions and desires of different people at different stages, phases, or situations of 
life, and how one identical, accidental property of something may appear 
pleasant to one, harmful to another, indifferent to a third, and simply useful to 
a fourth, there cannot be any tékhnê or precept for dealing with it. In addition, 
phrónêsis cannot be used to deliberate instrumentally about how to make 
anyone do what we want, or serve our purposes and at the same time remain 
itself. Doing that would reduce it to tékhnê.
Phrónêsis does not try to manipulate, or merely persuade, but must pre-
sent its own thinking and reasons for deciding and acting in certain ways as 
openly as possible to the mindful judgement of others, trying to show, and 
convince, making them see, but still respecting their autonomy (cf. 
Rh1378a6-21). Phrónêsis must take into consideration where the others are, 
emotionally, intellectually, and in their skills and attitudes, in trying to find 
the right thing to do, but it cannot use these circumstances manipulatively try-
21  See Rh1355a4-16, 1355b28-37, 1356a23-40, 1359b2-20/EN1094b4, 1181a15 
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ing to set through some hidden agenda, without ruining itself qua phrónêsis.
It must know how to deal with egotistical, strategic, manipulative behaviour 
in others without itself becoming like this, but also without simply being sub-
dued by it and letting such behaviour prevail in others and in general. So this 
is why phrónêsis is both ethical and intellectual, a) because we would blame 
someone for forgetting or neglecting to do these intellectual exercises in deal-
ing with others (acting e.g. as if we only perceived an abstract human being 
in front of us), b) because we would also blame someone for deliberating 
more cleverly for other – unethical – purposes in dealing with others, and c) 
because abstaining consciously and voluntarily from doing intellectual exer-
cises like these would be considered an ethical deficiency. 
But Aristotle does see many analogies between ethics / politics and ték-
hnê, especially with medicine. But the analogies have clear limits 
(EN1143b30-1144a9, Pol1269a19). The responsibility, the independence, 
and the autonomy of ethico-political virtue, is completely common to all who 
are able.22 Tékhnê cannot be universally common among human beings, 
however. Praxis can. Technical and instrumental relations cannot be general-
ised universally, since they are based on complementary differences and divi-
sions of labour, some being users or manipulators, others merely tools or ma-
terial. They are not based on similarity and on shared understanding and rela-
tions. Praxis is. In ethics there can be no such division of labour as there is in 
the technical arts. Ethics cannot be delegated to technical experts. We cannot 
do in ethics as we do in medicine. We do not all study medicine in order to 
become healthy. Instead we follow orders and recommendations, and get 
treatment from the experts who have, since medicine is mainly a technical art 
of making (poíêsis). But in ethics we cannot simply take the orders or advice 
of others who possess phrónêsis in the same way as we follow the advice 
from a doctor knowing medicine. Following the advice or orders from other 
individuals presumed competent is not sufficient in relation to the require-
ments for ethical virtue. 
Hence, the normative and prescriptive character of phrónêsis, giving rec-
ommendations, orders, or instructions, must be directed at an “I”, or a “we”, 
22  See EN1099b9-33, EE1214a15-b6&1215a13-19 
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not at (the soul or body of) externalised others not equally involved in the de-
liberation. We all have to acquire phrónêsis and act on our own. Here the 
persistent analogy with medicine finally breaks down. Medicine is a tékhnê
that produces health technically (poíêsis) in others as patients (páthos).
Rhetoric is a tékhnê that may very well produce “right” opinion and “correct” 
behaviour persuasively or seductively in others. But in ethics (praxis) no one 
could be a merely receptive patient, nor could anyone be a mere user. No one 
can merely be in the position of “material” or “instrument” for others’ manipulat-
ive creativity or utilization. Praxis cannot simply be imposed on others. Praxis
concerns what is shared and common, and a practical relation is a relation to what 
we share in common (e.g. language, standards of conduct) as human beings, or 
qua professionals, members of certain ethnic communities, etc. 
Phrónêsis, then, cannot make others virtuous in the same way as clinical 
medicine makes others healthy. It cannot even make ourselves virtuous, but 
presupposes that we already are, in the same way that professional delibera-
tion presupposes professional competence in certain disciplines. In ethics and 
politics we are all equally like the professional practitioners, carrying the full 
responsibility and the practical virtues ourselves. Hence, the analogy between 
the ethical virtues and the arts is made both stronger and weaker simultane-
ously. It is made stronger because everyone carries a “professional” respon-
sibility comparable to, or even more so than any technical artisan or master 
craftsman. But the analogy is made weaker too, because ethics does not use 
or make any thing as the arts do, and cannot relate to others as to externalised 
(mute, deaf, and dumb) things merely. 
Different ways of using lógos 
The question we might reasonably raise now is: What are the preconditions 
for doing intellectual exercises like those phrónêsis requires? Could any 
child, or fool, or uneducated individual do it? Would any of these in fact 
(want to) do them? It seems it requires some form of knowledge and under-
standing of what justice and other ethical virtues are. And in addition it re-
quires a general disposition or habitus making us inclined to and want to do 
the ethically right thing. This is where Aristotle brings in the virtues as pre-
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conditions. We have to be virtuous already in order to be able to and want to 
reason prudently. The ends for which phrónêsis deliberates are presented by 
the ethical virtues as “data”. And these ends are given by the virtues without
argument or reasoning according to Aristotle. But phrónêsis is definitely a 
way of arguing and reasoning, a way of using lógos.
So, how do we become virtuous, and how do we get to know and under-
stand the content of virtuous ends like e.g. justice, if not by “theory” or 
lógos? By “intuition”? By spontaneous imitation of others? By simply being 
socialised in any way into our local culture and community, and without any
use of any kind of lógos? It is hardly plausible. Phrónêsis only deliberates 
about means, not ends. Deliberation as a whole is about means, not ends. As 
already indicated, in this, phrónêsis resembles cleverness, a capacity to delib-
erate well about the means to any arbitrarily chosen end. Phrónêsis only de-
liberates about means for realising ethical virtue (aretê), and “happiness” 
(eudaimonía). So, phrónêsis does not determine or define ends (aims, objec-
tives) for actions in Aristotle’s scheme. Ends are given for phrónêsis by the 
ethical virtues. 
It is my contention that the question of how to engender the virtues as 
general capacities, and what is contained in such capacities is the most central 
question for Aristotelian philosophy and for ethics in particular. More details 
of this contention are contained in Eikeland (1997 and 2007). Here, I have to 
make the story shorter. How to engender the virtues is a question of how to 
learn and inquire, i.e. of how to acquire certain virtuous conditions and dispo-
sitions. In more modern parlance this is a question of how ethical and intel-
lectual competences are developed and explored. I think this is the most rele-
vant challenge for action research as well. Phrónêsis is not Aristotle’s an-
swer, and neither is ordinary didactic instruction, although both are contained 
in the answer. But both presuppose some form of general knowledge in the 
deliberator or teacher respectively. This is where my interpretation definitely 
parts from the otherwise very interesting interpretation presented by Dunne 
(1993: 291ff., cf. Dunne; 1999) where he ends up by giving phrónêsis a cen-
tral role in the genesis of virtue, and in inductive processes in general. But he 
doesn’t present any evidence in the texts of Aristotle for an interpretation like 
this. And, as will become clear, there is no need, nor possibility, for 
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phrónêsis, as it is defined in the Nicomachean Ethics, to take on a central role 
in these processes. Aristotle says interesting things about how these processes 
are guided by a different form of lógos.
In order to see the answer we have to realise that Aristotle talks about 
very many different ways of using lógos, i.e. of arguing. Phrónêsis is only 
one specific way. The question is: Does Aristotle mean any and every way of 
using lógos, or does he have specific ways of using lógos in mind when say-
ing a) that practical ends and principles of action are not apprehended 
through the use of lógos, and b) that basic theoretical principles as well are 
not apprehended by lógos? Different ways of using lógos for different pur-
poses are distributed by Aristotle, without much explanation, to different con-
texts and works. It is beyond much doubt that the persuasive lógos of the 
Rhetoric, the essential lógos of the Metaphysics, the deductive and didactic 
lógos of the Posterior Analytic, and the deliberative lógos of the Ethics, are 
all quite different. And Aristotle even speaks of a defining lógos, and an in-
ductive lógos. These ways of using lógos all have different tasks and ends to 
pursue, and their practices are structured differently accordingly. For our pur-
poses here, it is important to distinguish between 1) lógos-forms moving up-
wards from particulars and from how things appear to us at first, spontaneously 
and phenomenologically, to basic principles, general concepts, and ends, and 2) 
lógos-forms moving downwards from similar principles, concepts, and ends. 
Aristotle considers this difference crucial (cf. EN1095a31-b1). 
There are two separate ways of using lógos moving “down” according to 
Aristotle, 1) didactics or demonstration (apódeixis) and 2) deliberation 
(boúleusis). Both are said to argue from (apó) principles and ends, both pre-
suppose general competence and knowledge of ends in certain fields. But al-
though they both move in a similar direction from similar starting points, they 
move in quite different ways. Didactics moves demonstratively or deduc-
tively, applying formal syllogistic logic. It is primarily the way of the most 
finished and precise sciences where the meaning of terms used are held con-
stant through the reasoning process. But Aristotelian epistêmê is not restricted 
to what is described in the Nicomachean Ethics, concerning only eternal and 
necessary truths. Both music and grammar (APr43b18, Cat11a23-35, 
EN1112b2-3), and even boxing and wrestling are all called epistêmai
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(Cat10b1-7), neither of which is strikingly similar to the primary form. 
Epistêmê is also defined as knowledge of things that only for the most part 
(hôs epì tò polú) follow a regular pattern, and thereby, according to this crite-
rion alone, overlaps with areas that need deliberation, e.g. medicine, gymnas-
tics (Metaph1064a1), navigation, “business” (EN1112b5-10), ship-building 
(Pol1288b10-22), and even natural philosophy (Ph196b10-197a7, 198b33-
199b32). Natural philosophy, however, studies things that change naturally, 
not as a result of our intervention or activity. Hence, natural philosophy does 
not deliberate. But there is no doubt, neither in the Nicomachean Ethics
(1112a21-b12), nor in the Metaphysics (1064a2-10), that Aristotle sees dif-
ferent disciplines as having received an “epistemic” form to a greater or 
smaller degree. The less it has, the more it needs to deliberate. The more it 
resembles the “primary” epistêmê of Book VI in the Nicomachean Ethics,
however, the more it can go from deliberation to calculation, and deduction 
(cf. Pol1258b34). Technical calculation uses deduction too. But deliberation 
is not restricted in the same way. Deliberation is partly a) an analysis of the 
concrete situation, partly b) a weighing of different practical aims and argu-
ments against each other in deciding what to do. 
When Aristotle illustrates what he means he uses examples from profes-
sional disciplines (EN1112b12-16, EE1227b23-1228a4). The end of medi-
cine is securing and producing health, the end of politics is making good 
laws, the end of oratory persuasion, etc. When professionals act as profes-
sionals, they do not deliberate about the ends of their disciplines. They know 
them and take them for granted. They deliberate about how to achieve the 
end, i.e. about the means. Usually Aristotle takes contexts like this for 
granted in ethics too, where ethically virtuous individuals are presupposed to 
know the virtues in a similar way to how professionals know their disciplines. 
When, occasionally, he specifies, as he does in Book VII of the Nicomachean
Ethics (1151a15-19), it becomes clear that he does not have just any kind of 
lógos in mind when claiming that the virtues render the principles and ends 
without lógos. What he means is that ends and principles are apprehended 
without the didactic, deductive lógos, moving down. So ends and principles 
are provided neither by deliberation nor by deduction, i.e. by none of the 
forms moving downwards from principles and ends. Now there are three in-
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tellectual virtues that move downwards: Epistêmê moves down deductively 
or demonstratively, or in a didactic manner. Its conclusions remain descrip-
tively within language. Cleverness and phrónêsis move down deliberatively. 
They conclude with actions. But none of them provide ends and principles. 
And this is the point. In spite of some confusing remarks, I think it is clear 
that some other ways of using lógos are involved, even for Aristotle, in a) 
clarifying and defining ends and principles, and in b) distinguishing particu-
lars too. As I try to show in some detail in Eikeland (2007), there is an induc-
tive way, and a defining and revealing way of using reasoned speech, in-
volved. It is important to remember, however, that neither “induction” nor 
“definition” can be assimilated to purely formal or verbal exercises in Aris-
totle. They are not “non-verbal” either, but formative of habitus. This forma-
tive way is dialogue or dialectics. Inducing and defining are dialogical ends. 
According to Aristotle, dialogue proper explores and inquires systematically 
into differences and similarities, it constructs and deconstructs, and it works 
inductively from particulars and by defining, towards principles and ends. It 
starts from wherever partners in dialogue are and in their acquired experience 
(empeiría). It creates transitions and transformations (metabibázontes, meta-
baínein) in personal understanding, advancing to deeper insight by grasping 
premises and principles (e.g. Top101a34, Metaph1029b3-12, EN1097a24, 
EE1216b30). Two intellectual virtues are dialogical: nous in analysing and 
articulating principles, and súnesis in analysing and articulating the concrete 
situation critically. In Eikeland (1997 and 2007) I have tried to show in detail 
how particulars are apprehended in Aristotle and to show how and why nous
should be interpreted as a dialogical habitus (héxis dialektikê) in analogy to 
and complementary to how epistêmê is called a deductive or demonstrative 
habitus (héxis apodeiktikê) by Aristotle himself. 
Hence, the core task and practice of dialogue or dialectics, explored pri-
marily in Aristotle’s work Topica, is neither rhetorical (moving an audience), 
nor deliberative (finding the right or smart thing to do), nor deductive (prov-
ing that some defined and known property belongs to something), nor for-
mally syllogistic (reasoning sophistically as if words / terms were unambigu-
ous). Dialogue pursues a common task of generating knowledge, understand-
ing, and insight. It is transformative through defining and distinguishing simi-
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larities and differences in actions, things observed, words used, etc. Hence, 
there is a specific approach at stake with dialogue, different from rhetoric, de-
liberation, deduction, and formal syllogistic reasoning, as specified ways of 
using lógos, but also different from negotiations, and considerably more than 
merely psychologically comforting talk and “small talk”.23 Dialogue, or dia-
lectics, is a way of thinking and speaking that may be performed either alone 
or in conversing others. It has nothing to do with merely two (dúo) people 
talking to each other. Dialogue is a distinctive cognitive, emotional, and prac-
tical process – usually unfolded among several participants – that proceeds 
critically through (dià) common ways of speaking and through reasoned 
speech ([tou] lógou).
In Aristotle’s scheme of things, dialogue belongs primarily to theoretical
reason, since it is usually done in order to gain insight into or understanding 
of intellectual, ethical, social, political, historical, cultural, and other kinds of 
landscapes or topographies we live and enact. It is not practical in the sense 
that it is directed to promote some specific action or decision as a conclusion. 
This is important in order to prevent it from transforming into rhetoric. But 
dialogue has a practical starting point in being about our personal, acquired 
experience and about developing our habitus from incompetence, through the 
acquisition of experience (empeiría), to virtue. This dialogical way upwards 
includes the task of collective learning in the practical development of estab-
lishing what Aristotle calls concord (homónoia). Our habitus is moulded in 
and enacts the landscapes suggested. Dialogue forms and transforms our in-
dividual and collective habitus. Hence exploring our individual and collective 
habitus dialogically is the most promising way to knowledge and understand-
ing of the different topographies (cf. Eikeland 2006a). So, dialogue is about 
articulating tacit knowing, and about guiding and accompanying a defining 
and perfecting movement from within practices, through training and practice 
(teleíôsis / ethismós / áskêsis / melétê), from any potential to perfected activ-
23  This specifically dialogical approach is even differentiated into several subdivisions 
with different techniques, determined by their different ends by both Plato and Aris-
totle. I will not discuss these further here, but see Eikeland (1997: 163-299). 
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ity.24 Dialogue belongs primarily to a praxis1 moving “upwards” (Einübung
in German), while phrónêsis belongs primarily to a praxis2 moving “down-
wards” (Ausübung in German). To these correspond different aspects of Aris-
totelian ethics I call “theor-ethics” and “phron-ethics”, presented and dis-
cussed in Eikeland (2007). While deduction may seem more abstract, “lin-
ear”, and detached, the defining part of theoretical reason, then, is clearly not 
unhooked from emotions, practice, and experience. The defining work neces-
sarily elaborates and sorts experiential and experimental similarities and dif-
ferences from within emotions and practice. But it does this for the sake of 
theory – developing competence, insight, and understanding – not merely for 
the sake of deciding what to do here and now. 
Neo-epistemic, dialogical action research 
So, where does this bring us in relation to the authors presented earlier in this 
article? My conclusion is that Aristotle does not operate with the kind of total 
dichotomy that especially Toulmin and Flyvbjerg operate with. First of all, 
divisions do not necessarily operate in pairs, neither in Aristotle nor in the 
real world. In addition the divisions are not always mutually exclusive. There 
are many overlaps, and many fuzzy borderlines. But where Aristotle makes 
distinctions for specific purposes between e.g. deliberation, dialogue, rheto-
ric, and phrónêsis, Toulmin and Schwandt especially, conflate distinctions as 
if they did not have specific tasks to solve, but were all almost synonymous. 
Next, neither phrónêsis and dialogue, nor ethics and politics, lend themselves 
to any kind of technical and complementary division of labour between ex-
perts and clients. Both Toulmin and Flyvbjerg continue writing and acting as 
if they do, however. Flyvbjerg even bases and constructs his own “phronetic” 
research on such a division. But by conflating erroneously and making the 
wrong distinctions in much too dichotomous ways, the way Aristotle is prac-
tical even in his most theoretical endeavours becomes completely invisible, 
i.e. in what I called praxis1 elaborated dialogically. But as I see it, this is ex-
actly where action research most of all needs to learn from Aristotle in order 
24  John Shotter (1993) and his action research followers should read Aristotle on devel-
oping emergent knowledge from within practices 
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to be more than just applied research, and in order to be able to challenge the 
dominant modern concepts of theory and science. Flyvbjerg does not want to 
be “analytical”. But with Aristotle both phrónêsis and súnesis, through dia-
logue, are necessarily analytical in sorting similarities and differences both in 
particular situations and in general concepts. Flyvbjerg and Schwandt seem to 
think acquired practical experience (empeiria) is peculiar to phrónêsis. But 
this kind of experience is the basis for all the intellectual virtues, while ethi-
cal virtue and phrónêsis are explicitly not reducible to this in Aristotle. 
I started out by claiming that focusing on phrónêsis alone, and in isolation 
from the totality of the philosophy of Aristotle, could easily reinforce an in-
sufficient practice orientation. There is hardly any reason to doubt, I think, 
that phrónêsis properly understood, as Aristotle thought of it, mainly takes 
principles and ends for granted, through and from the virtues, in searching for 
the right means here and now. It doesn’t develop and define the ends and 
principles itself, but leaves that to experience-based nous and dialogue. De-
liberation is a general and common competence that presupposes more spe-
cialised and substantial competences and insight. It is for “professionals” in 
every field, even as phrónêsis for “professionals” in ethics and politics. This 
makes phrónêsis, or deliberation more generally, necessary for all practical 
purposes, but insufficient at the same time, since “professionalism” must first 
be acquired. 
Action research works in similarly insufficient ways, when the action is 
emphasized more than the research process, and it becomes project work or 
problem-solving activity in collaboration between researchers and practitio-
ners, applying general knowledge acquired elsewhere and in other ways, at 
best. But action research is not just deliberation and application, which pre-
supposes adequate general knowledge and virtue. Conceptually action re-
search must encompass both the research process and the application process. 
Hence, action research and action researchers have to work with developing 
systematic, practically based insight as an aim in itself as well, challenging 
how basic social research has been done methodologically and organised in-
stitutionally for the most part in the modern period. As I said at the begin-
ning, action research cannot just serve everyday practical concerns, and the 
goals of social science too, without transforming both. This is easily ne-
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glected by carving out a separate and special “niche” for action research as 
complementary “mediator” in-between the existing academic world and prac-
titioners, leaving “epistêmê” in the modern sense alone, instead of encom-
passing and transforming both the institutionalisation of social research and 
our everyday practices in ways rendering space for praxis, phrónêsis, and 
dialogue within practice based communities of inquiry. 
Hence, basic action research would profit much by appropriating a differ-
ent “middle ground” delineated by Aristotle’s concept of the epistêmai, be-
tween conventional modernist social science pretending to be astronomy (or 
technology) on the one hand, and non-epistemic and un-principled everyday 
deliberation on the other. Aristotle has a lot to contribute in order for people 
not to become totally framed by institutionalised current divisions of labour 
and collaboration, quasi-essentialising the frameworks as a “Quasi-Platonic, 
Niche-Republic” where all play their appointed, complementary roles, noth-
ing more. Action research should not and cannot be reduced to reasoning 
“from” and within such given ends and principles, neither as deductive 
“proof”, nor as mere unprincipled deliberation or application. If action re-
search is going to be more than just “applied research”, or complementary 
“research/er assistance” to practical development processes, leaving basic re-
search uncritically to other approaches, it has to concern itself with and trans-
form the formative learning processes and the research work directed towards 
principles, ends, and definitions, too. 
So, instead of “stretching for” an epistemic model borrowed from astron-
omy in moving “up” towards principles, based on “experience” as observa-
tion from a distance, and on data as bits of information, and on formal deduc-
tion moving “down” from them, Aristotle’s epistemic model works upwards 
dialogically, based on, and focused on analysing the acquired practical ex-
perience and habitus of the researchers-learners themselves, cast and in-
scribed in social, economic, and other institutionalised historical arrange-
ments (cf. Eikeland, 2006a). Most of what Aristotle actually calls epistêmê
works downwards mainly by deliberating, adjusting to the circumstances. 
This means that instead of studying “the others” (the natives) as objects and 
events “in nature”, from the viewpoint of external spectators or manipulators, 
in order to predict, modify, and control their behaviour, the dialogical ap-
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proach studies, as a combined researcher-researched-performer, the “how-to-
do-things” and the “what-it-means-to-be-or-perform-as-something”, through 
inner objects and objectives, as “things” or forms of practice we have (poten-
tially) in common as proficient practitioners and natives, in order to solve 
impasses and pragmatic contradictions, and improve individual and collective 
practices. Action research, then, cannot merely “move down” “phronetically” 
from spectator-based theory. Action research must primarily “move up” and 
be the dialogical development of kinds of skills and knowledge that are not 
about external things and events. Instead it must organise and structure the 
competence of its carriers, within a certain field, or in general, and become 
primarily a qualification of these carriers themselves, as with grammar. It re-
mains, however, to unfold the details of a research practice based on the dia-
logical insights found in the writings of Aristotle. 
Also, in order to develop the epistemic impulses and desires within the 
everyday life-worlds of most people, special preconditions must be provided, 
different from normal, “problem-solving” project-organisations, or “special 
task forces”, and also different from everyday work organisations and “busi-
ness-as-usual”.25 A permanent skholê (leisure – open, free space – school) 
embedded in practical settings is needed, making it possible to develop, un-
fold, and articulate the “grammars” of different social settings. All the au-
thors commented in this article seem to miss this point completely in their di-
chotomous thinking dividing modern science, confusingly baptized epistêmê,
from a totally separated and segregated phrônêsis, often having little resem-
blance to Aristotle’s original. Thinking as they do, this whole dimension of 
Aristotle’s philosophy disappears. Western institutions, and their divisions of 
labour, are undoubtedly partly a product of how Aristotle has been inter-
preted through the centuries. But his emphasis on practical experience and 
dialogue, as “the way” to all principles and ends, has hardly been understood 
nor heeded. Hence, schools have been insulated from practical settings, and 
25  Also different I believe a) from the socio-cultural learning theory of e.g. Wells (1999), 
inspired by Bakhtin and Vygotsky, b) from the learning by legitimate peripheral par-
ticipation (LPP) of Lave/Wenger (1991), opposing a form of “learning by hanging 
around” (LPP) to a unilaterally didactic school-learning, and c) from problem based 
learning (PBL). A comparison with these needs a separate treatment though. 
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filled with didactic, deductive teaching much more than with dialogical learn-
ing, while research institutions have been “observatories” equally insulated, 
or “laboratories” researching other humans as “natural objects” receiving 
treatment and manipulation, explaining their behaviour with “covering laws” 
and statistics, instead of providing standards and methodological guidelines for 
each and every autonomous practitioner, as “grammarians” of social practices. 
Not only dialogical basic research is experience-based, however. Even the 
deductive didactics of Aristotle is based on preconditions of prior accumu-
lated experience among the listeners, and, of course, among the teachers. Di-
dactic teachers were supposed to be master craftsmen and ethical virtuosos, 
and the students were supposed to have sufficient experience and training al-
ready, to be able to understand what the systematized didactic teaching was 
about. Didactic teaching, alone and in itself, did not provide the necessary ba-
sis for understanding. What schools have become, however, are places where 
teachers specialised in a separate discipline of teaching, mostly teach without 
being experienced masters in the subjects they teach, and where students, at 
their best, listen and try to remember without experience. Instead of teaching 
being a different, more “architectonic” aspect of substantial professional 
practice, it has mostly become a separate profession in itself, just as the soph-
ists operated (wrongly) in teaching politics, according to Aristotle 
(EN1180b28-1181b12). Instead of experience, words have been transmitted, 
replacing it, hence mostly empty. Students are not attending as apprentices 
either, on their way to become as their teachers, masters of a professional dis-
cipline. Instead of letting the speech of teaching help organise and systema-
tize the presupposed previously accumulated or simultaneous experience of 
the students, the speech of teaching, together with learning by listening, re-
places experience, requiring students to believe what they hear (SE165b3). 
Formal, abstract reasoning (logikós), not germane to the subjects at hand, was 
sophistic, according to Aristotle (SE169b20, 171b7). But it has dominated 
scientific thinking for centuries. So, even though Aristotle more than the 
sophists, has been used as legitimising authority (and has taken the blame), 
the sophists, more than Aristotle, have been running the show. 
What we can learn from Aristotle, then, is that systematic space, for both 
dialogue and deliberation, is necessary in practical social life: work life, pri-
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vate life, professional, ethical, and political. Trying to eliminate it, replacing 
it with hierarchical, “deductive”, or technical practices in order to become 
“more exact” and efficient, not only breaks down the autonomy, dignity, and 
responsibility of all practitioners, wearing them out, but it seems by a neces-
sary tendency, to produce more inexact results in areas (genera) not suited.26 I 
think Aristotle as well as anyone after him, has explained both why this is so, 
and what dialogue and deliberation means. In spite of contradictory evidence, 
what Aristotle conveys, is an understanding of why deliberation and dialogue
cannot be separated and delegated to specialists within a social or technical di-
vision of labour. Both deliberation and dialogue are necessary, but they are not 
to be confused or conflated. They have different roles to play, different tasks to 
perform. Deliberation is part of professional practice, ethical conduct, and po-
litical discussion, where ends, principles, and causes are chosen arbitrarily, or 
defined and given from the institutional frameworks and framed positions of 
these activities, as well as by conscious definitions and limits set by the profes-
sions themselves. Within certain limits like these, “nobody” deliberates about 
ends. Everyone takes them for granted. Proper dialogue, however, is transcend-
ing and transformative, transcending all institutional frameworks and horizons 
(being in itself an ultimate horizon) by bringing the local frameworks them-
selves “into the middle” and “into the commons” as a theme for critical dia-
logue, instead of letting them frame and direct the conversation. If, then, delib-
eration is part of professional practice performing, dialogue is professional 
practice reflecting and inquiring. And, although difficult to keep apart in real 
life, the conceptual distinctions are important. 
Obviously, to talk as Aristotle does about wisdom and happiness today 
might seem a bit far-fetched, and even ridiculous, at least when dealing with 
the trivia of the everyday life-world, as action research does and has to do. 
The content properly transposed and transformed, is not ridiculous, however. 
The desire and demand for wisdom both theoretical (sophía) and practical 
26  This seems gradually to become better understood, although not in Aristotelian terms, 
by mainstream organisational research as well, as indicated e.g. by the authors, all 
leading figures, in Tsoukas (1994). “Organisational ambiguity makes instrumental ac-
tion far less effective than is conventionally assumed”, as Tsoukas (1994: 18) himself 
points out. 
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(phrónêsis) and for happiness as well functioning (eupraxía) have all in many 
ways reappeared as a serious concern for supporting sustainable, well func-
tioning, reflecting, and learning communities of practice in professional 
work, and in both work life and social life in general.27 Working to develop 
and maintain “good practices”, “excellence”, and “quality” (albeit often de-
termined merely by customers’ market demand), securing and providing for 
their preconditions, these are all on the agenda today as much as ever. With 
today’s educational level of professional workers, and the knowledge inten-
sity of production, the preconditions for suspending the division of labour be-
tween thinking and behaving, are present more than ever too. A conclusion 
from the previous exposition could be, then, that general phrónêsis is very 
important as a skill in “clearing the ground” for “the way” of “wisdom” (or-
ganisational learning) and “happiness” (unimpeded work performance in 
work organisations) to establish itself. But phrónêsis is insufficient alone. 
Action research cannot be just phrónêsis. Nothing can be merely phrónêsis, 
since phrónêsis is the ultimate, practical perfection of the other virtues – ethi-
cal and intellectual – stretching towards judgement and decisions about par-
ticulars, while these virtues themselves – as general dispositions and habitus
– are developed in different ways, dialogically. 
In summary, the thrust of the whole argument is towards a different social 
organisation of knowledge management and knowledge generation, and a 
completely different institutionalisation and transformation of “social re-
search”, as something that has to be cultivated in practical contexts, letting 
the “natives” themselves start “dialectical gatherings” in order to map their 
social, intellectual, organisational, relational, emotional, economic, etc. to-
pographies, enabling them to experiment, learn, deliberate, choose, act, and 
cooperate more wisely. In the aftermath of Gibbons et al. (1994), such an 
emerging “new mode (mode 2) of knowledge production” has moved in-
creasingly into the focus of discussions about the altering relations between 
research institutions, educational institutions, and work life organisations. In 
a way, the follow-up by Nowotny et al. (2001) has set the stage with “new 
27  See e.g. Schön (1983, 1987), Argyris/Schön (1996), Senge (1990), Wenger (1998), 
Wenger/McDermott/Snyder (2002). 
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constellations” (Bernstein; 1991) for a new kind of discussion – reshuffling 
old elements – by re-introducing a “post-modern” concept of the agorá or 
public space to the centre of the discussion. The ancient agorá or forum is the 
historical starting point both for thinking about and the real history of some 
of the most central institutions of Western civilisation, like markets, public 
spheres, popular assemblies, schools, news media, courts of law, and theatres. 
Hence, re-introducing the agorá sets the stage for new kinds of discussions 
about how these institutions could and should relate, and be “re-shuffled”, 
under new conditions for learning and knowledge production in the 21st cen-
tury.28 Phrónêsis is still highly relevant. But rightly understood, not alone. 
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